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DAMAGES FOR DRY HOLE TRESPASS
HERBERT QUALLS, JR.*
An oil and gas question that has long perplexed courts
and legal writers is whether damages may be recovered for
loss of market value of land for oil and gas purposes, caused
by the drilling of a dry hole by a trespasser In this
discussion damages for loss of market value of land for oil
and gas purposes will be referred to as market value damages,
and the drilling of a dry hole by a trespasser will be referred
to as dry hole trespass.
The actual question has been decided in only three juris-
dictions, two, allowing recovery and one 2 denying it. A
division exists among the law writers with one group favoring
recovery, 3 another opposing recovery4 and a third suggest-
ing that recovery should be allowed only if a specific offer
for lease or purchase can be shown.5  A similar division
exists among the authors of student notes in the law reviews
with notes favoring6 and opposing7 recovery and in an
intermediary position." Thus, there is considerable author-
ity on either side.
Market value damages should not be confused with
damages for the actual physical injury caused by the dry
hole trespass, for it is well settled that the landowner may
recover for loss of cattle, breaking of gates and fences, cutting
of trees, driving of heavy vehicles on the land, drilling of the
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La. 807, 33 So. 2d 527 (1947).
2. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927).
3. KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS § 10.9 (1954) MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 44 (1935) Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEXAS
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hole and other physical damages done by the trespasser.9
However, these damages are seldom substantial, generally
not exceeding a few hundred dollars, while the market value
damages may be thousands of dollars.
The leading case allowing recovery of market value
damages for dry hole trespass is Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v Kishi.10  Kishi was the owner of the surface and of a
three-fourths undivided interest in the oil and gas in a fifty
acre tract in Orange County, Texas. On December 23, 1919,
he executed an oil and gas lease, bearing that date, to
Humble Oil & Refining Company which was signed and
acknowledged by his co-tenant, Lang, on January 29, 1920.
The lease provided for a primary term of three years and
contained the usual clause which extended the life of the
lease "so long thereafter" as oil or gas should be produced
in paying quantities.
No operations were begun before the expiration of the
lease, and Humble, with full recognition that the lease had
expired, unsuccessfully bargained with Kishi for a new lease.
In January, 1923, oil was discovered on adjoining land, and
Humble, claiming that the lease had not expired, re-entered
the land with Lang's permission to drill. Kishi protested
the re-entry, and after commencement of drilling, delivered
a written demand that Humble vacate the land. Humble,
however, remained in possession until the well, a dry hole,
had been completed.
There was evidence that an oil and gas lease of Kishi's
land would have commanded a cash bonus of from $750 to
$2,500 per acre at the time of the trespass, but there was no
showing that Kishi had an opportunity to lease or would have
accepted an offer
The District Court found that Humble was a trespasser,
but denied Kishi relief, stating that damages were "highly
speculative, remote, and contingent" The Court of Civil
9. Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 212 La. 807, 33 So. 2d 527 (1947) Layne
Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So. 2d 20 (1946) Tidewater
Associated Oil Co. v. Shipp, 59 N.M. 37, 278 P.2d 571 (1954) Wilson v. Texas
Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo.
92, 237 Pac. 255 (1925).




Appeals reversed and remanded, conditioning recovery upon
Kishi's ability to prove an offer and his willingness to accept.
The Commission of Appeals of the Supreme Court reversed
both lower courts and remanded, holding that "the exclusive
right to enter upon the land, drill wells thereon and remove
therefrom the oil to exhaustion" was a "property right which
the law protects" without the showing of an offer and a
willingness to accept.
Texas courts have had occasion to comment on the Kisht
case and have always stated that it remained "good law" 11
In the second case allowing market value damages for
dry hole trespass, Matheson v Placid Oil Co., 1 2 the Mathe-
sons, who owned a 160 acre tract in Yrant Parish, Louisiana,
granted an oil and gas lease to Mitchell. The primary term
was three years, but a clause provided that if Mitchell failed
to drill within ninety days the lease would terminate.
Mitchell breached the condition, and the lease terminated;
but, nevertheless, he assigned to Grandstaff. Grandstaff
began operations and assigned to Placid Oil Company which
completed the well as a dry hole.
The Mathesons claimed damages for the loss of the cash
bonus and royalty interest and for physical injury to the land.
The District Court allowed only market value damages equal
to the cash bonus. Apparently neither the litigants nor the
Louisiana Supreme Court were aware of the controversy
over market value damages, as that portion of the lower
court's decision relating to market value damages was affirm-
ed with no discussion of either the merits or the authorities.
The court's attention was primarily directed to whether the
awarding of market value damages precluded, in the same
action, the allowance of damages for physical injury to the
land. The court found that it did not and gave the plaintiffs
damages for the physical injury There was no consideration
of the claim for market value damages based upon the royalty
interest.
11. Jarrett v. Ross, 139 Tex. 560, 164 S.W.2d 550 (1942) Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Wood, 294 S.W 197 (Tex. Com. App. 1927) Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Luckel, 154 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) McCoy v. Texon Royalty Co.,
124 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
12. 212 La. 807, 33 So. 2d 527 (1947).
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The contrary result was reached in Martel v Hall Oil
Co.13  Barquin, owner of a tract of land in Wyoming,
executed an oil and gas lease in 1915 which was assigned to
the Hall Oil Company In 1917 Barquin executed a mineral
deed, which included oil and gas, to Martel. Barquin notified
Hall that he considered Hall's lease void, but Hall refused
to grant a release. Whereupon Barquin brought suit for
cancellation, obtaining a favorable judgment in 1919. During
the litigation Hall contracted with Midwest Oil Company to
drill on the land. Midwest, over the protest of Martel and
Barqum, entered and drilled a dry hole.
Martel brought this second action against Hall and Mid-
west to recover market value damages for the dry hole
trespass. The District Court directed a verdict for the
defendants which was affirmed by the Wyoming Supreme
Court with the modification that nominal damages be given,
because interference with the exclusive right to drill was a
"technical violation of the rights of the plaintiff" The
Supreme Court primarily rested its decision on damages being
"speculative," a word to which it unwittingly attributed two
meanings.
The court first found that damages were "speculative,"
meaning difficult or impossible of ascertainment, because of
five facts:
1. Though a government oil reserve was one-half mile
away, it had yielded no production.
2. The cash bonus value of lands in the oil reserve
ranged from $25 to $265 per acre.
3. No actual sales of oil rights in the reserve had taken
place the year of the trespass.
4. The nearest producing well was two miles from
Martel's land.
5. There was no evidence of the production of this well.
After determining that the market value was uncertain
or "speculative," the court asked, "Does such speculative
13. 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927).
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value furnish any basis for damages in favor of plaintiffs?"
Although the question should have been answered "yes,"
because difficulty in ascertaining the amount is no reason
to deny damages;14 or "no," because the amount was not
shown with sufficient certainty; 15 the court abruptly changed
its definition of "speculative" from an uncertain value to a
market value obtained by "some wild speculation or the
prevalence of a gross error," and denied substantial recovery
because "there is other, more satisfactory, evidence of the
actual value" - the actual value of the oil and gas located
under the land.
It has been suggested 16 that Martel is not incompatible
with KishL and that Wyoming would follow Kisht if presented
with a comparable fact pattern, but this seems unlikely The
Wyoming court, which could have distinguished Kishi and
rested its decision on the uncertainty of the market value,
chose to decide on the broader ground that there was nothing
to protect. The court stated: "We are cited to the case of
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v Kishl (Tex. Com. App.) 276 S.W
190, decided in 1925. The case is exactly in point, but, with
all due respect to the eminent court that decided that case,
we cannot agree with its reasoning, and we think that the
court overlooked some of the fundamental principles here
pointed out, that should govern a case of this kind."
The question of whether damages are appropriate for loss
of market value of land for oil and gas purposes has arisen
in three other factual situations than dry hole trespass. An
examination of these cases indicates that courts have
generally been willing to allow recovery of such damages:
1. With the exception of an older case,'1 7 courts have
awarded damages for loss of market value of land for
oil and gas purposes caused by the clouding of title
to land by the defendant while oil and gas operations
on adjoining property depreciated oil and gas values
14. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 76 F Supp. 250 (Ct. Cl.
1948).
15. Wilhelm -Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W 634 (1936).
16. Note, Another Look at the Martel Case, 11 WYo. L.J. 109 (1957).
17. South Penn Oil Co. v. Stone, 57 S.W 374 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). Plaintiff
could have executed an oil and gas lease for $15,000 if defendant had not clouded
the title by obtaining an injunction. Plaintiff was refused recovery, because the
court considered the lack of oil and gas, not the injunction, to be the proximate
cause of her injury.
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by indicating that the land would not be productive
of oil or gas,"8 particularly where the injured party
could show the loss of an opportunity to make an oil
and gas lease. 19
2. Damages have been allowed for loss of market value
of land for oil and gas purposes caused by unauthorized
conduct by trespass of geophysical operations on the
land which indicated that it would not be productive
of oil or gas. 20  Recovery has not been permitted in
cases where plaintiff failed to show a bona fide loss.
21
3. The market value of land for oil and gas purposes has
been considered in fixing the value of that land for
condemnation proceedings, even though the land might
not actually contain oil or gas.22  It is easier,
however, to permit a recovery based on oil and gas
value in this type of situation where it has not actually
been determined that the land contains no oil or gas.
The Martel case, which disallowed market value damages
for dry hole trespass, and those authorities who approve of
the decision cite these seven substantial reasons in support
of their position. Each of these seven is followed by a
critical examination by this writer-
1. Damages are too uncertain to assess, as market
18. American Sur. Co. v. Marsh, 146 Oki. 261, 293 Pac. 1041 (1930). Plaintiff
was allowed damages for loss of market value of land for oil and gas purposes
caused by the drilling of a dry hole on adjacent property while defendant held
plaintiff's land, pending unsuccessful appeal of a lower court decision that plain-
tiff had a valid lease.
19. Hunt Oil Co. v. Berry, 86 So. 2d 7 (Miss. 1956). Plaintiff was awarded
damages for loss of chance to make an oil and gas lease covering part of land
whose title was wrongfully clouded by defendant, but was denied damages for
loss of market value for oil and gas purposes of the remaining portion of the
land, as the court felt such damages were "too uncertain and indefinite" Solberg
v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926). Plaintiff was al-
lowed damages for loss of chance to make an oil and gas lease because of
negligent failure of defendant to publish a declaration clearing the record of a
valid, though no longer binding, instrument. Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959). Plaintiff was awarded damages for loss of chance to
make an oil and gas lease because of claim of defendant that defendant's lease
had been maintained by shut-in-gas clause although defendant's well was. in
fact, not capable of producing gas in paying quantities.
20. Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
Recovery of $7,500 allowed.
21. Thomas v. Texas Co., 12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Appellant
offered no evidence showing that this trespass proximately resulted in the
loss of the market value of his property."
22. Cal-Bay Corp. v. United States, 169 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1948) Eagle Lake
Improvement Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1944) United States
v. 31,221.07 Acres of Land, 143 F Supp. i85 (D.C.W.D. La. 1956).
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value of oil and gas properties cannot be accurate-
ly determined.
23
In areas where oil and gas are produced, land has an
approximate market value for this purpose. This value,
which ranges from very little or nothing to thousands of
dollars per acre, is determined primarily by the concensus
of the oil community as to the probability and extent of oil
or gas. 24  Other determinative factors include geographic
location, proximity to a pipe line or other transportation
facility, the general level of wholesale and retail prices in
the industry, the outlook for the industry, and the national
economic picture.
Although market prices for oil and gas land contain a
strong element of volatility, a court can determine the market
value of a particular tract at a particular time with the help
of company landmen, independent operators, local specula-
tors, and others who qualify as oil and gas experts.
If difference of opinion exists among the experts as to
value, the court can fix a reasonable figure after hearing the
testimony In the Kisht case four persons testified that the
market value of the cash bonus per acre was respectively
$2,500, $1,500, $1,000 and $750. The trial court found the
value to have been $1,000 per acre. Regardless of whether
the court considered that all of these were Kishi's witnesses
or whether it discarded the top figure as being excessive,
and selected $1,000 as the median of the remaining three, the
result seems reasonable.
To require a landowner, who has been injured by a
trespasser's admitted misconduct, to prove exact damages is
unjust. Uncertainty as to the measure or extent of damages
is not sufficient to bar recovery 25 Indeed, there is authority
that if damages are uncertain the wrongdoer should pay the
largest reasonable sum.
26
23. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., Supra note 2.
24. Walker, Fee Simple Ounership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEXAS L. REV.
125, 136 (1928).
25. Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Ida. 416, 263 P.2d 705 (1953)
SoI-O-Lite Luminating Corp. v. Allen, 223 Ore. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960) Kowlng
v. Williams, 75 S.D. 454, 67 N.W.2d 780 (1954) , 25 C.J.S. DAMAGES § 28 (1941).
26. Independent Commercial Printers, Inc. v. Atkinson, 136 Wash. 628, 241
Pac. 2 (1925).
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2. This interest does not merit protection because
the oil and gas rights were actually valueless.
27
This reasoning strikes at the oil industry's acquisition
methods, the oil and gas lease and the sale of the oil and gas
estate (in an ownership in place state) or the exclusive right
to take the oil and gas (in a non-ownership state) If this
interest in property which lacks oil and gas does not merit
protection against a trespasser, then a landowner who leases
or sells oil and gas rights in land which does not contain
these minerals has given no consideration and should not be
entitled to retain money paid him for the conveyance.
The present method of leasing oil and gas properties
without actual knowledge of the oil or gas within has proven
beneficial both to the industry and to landowners. It permits
oil companies to obtain adequate reserves without requiring
immediate drilling, and provides landowners reasonable
development with just compensation for delay This leasing
system does not limit compensation to those lessors whose
land produces, but gives some return to all in cash bonuses,
royalty interests and delay rentals. The Martel approach
may not threaten this method of acquisition, but it is
unrealistic and inconsistent with oil and gas development
theory
The idea that land has no oil or gas value because
subsequent events show there was actually no oil or gas
present is a basic misconception. 28 Anyone interested in
acquiring an oil and gas property knows that it may be
barren, and this primarily determines its market value. If
an intelligent oil and gas speculator or an oil company wishes
to lease oil and gas land for X dollars, well knowing that it
may contain no oil or gas, why should not a wrongdoer who
has taken the property with the same knowledge and for the
same purpose, depriving the owner of a chance to realize
on it, pay X dollars in damages! What better indication is
there of value at any given time than actual market value -
27. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., supra note 2 Green, What Protection Has a Land-
owner Against a Trespass Which Merely Destroys the Speculative Value of His
Property?, 4 TEXAs L. REv. 215, 222 (1926) Notes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 485 (1935)
36 YALE L.J. 1167 (1927) , 1 Wyo. L.J. 123 (1947).




the amount an informed oil and gas businessman in an equal
bargaining position would be willing to pay
One authority 29 suggests an analogy in which "a contest-
ant was prevented by wrongful conduct of defendant from
realizing on his chance for a prize of supposedly great value,
but which in fact was without value, or a case in which there
was in fact no prize at all" This analogy is inaccurate
because the landowner did not have a supposedly valuable
prize of no actual value, but had a valuable interest to sell,
the nature of which was clearly recognized by potential
purchasers and which would have brought him a good price
regardless of the oil or gas content.
Though the oil and gas market value be destroyed by
dry hole trespass, there is no certainty that the property
does not actually contain oil or gas which could be produced
by drilling deeper or on another part of the land.3 0  For
example, in the Oklahoma City oil fields the first well drilled
was a dry hole, and ten years passed before large quantities
of oil were discovered by deeper drilling.
3. There is no "theory of action" on which to base
recovery l
Summers, feeling that facts must present "a well defined
theory of action" before damages should be allowed, considers
these possibilities:
a) ejectment or trespass to try title
b) trespass quare clausum
c) slander of title
d) disparagement of quality or value of property
He states that:
"If the plaintiff in the Kishi case had a well defined
theory of action it does not appear in the pleadings
or in the opinion. In the pleadings he merely sets
out the facts of the trespass, the depreciation of the
29. Green, op. cit. supra note 27.
30. KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS § 10.9 (1954).
31. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 25 (1954) Green, op. cit. 8upra
note 29.
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market value of a lease of his interest and the court
permitted a recovery upon proof of the market value
of his undivided interest. The steps by which the
court reasoned to this conclusion are as follows:
The plaintiff's rights and privileges respecting the oil
and gas in his land constitute a property interest
which the law protects; the defendant's entry upon
the land claiming privileges of producing oil and gas
therefrom amounted to a trespass and a violation of
the plaintiff's rights; the property interest of the
plaintiff in the oil and gas had a market value which
was destroyed or depreciated by the defendant's act;
the damages for the defendant's wrongful act should
be measured by the depreciation in the market value
of plaintiff's property interest "
To demand a "well defined theory of action" is contrary
to the ideals of modern pleading, as expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires only a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief, "32 and in the Texas Code which calls for
"9 a concise statement of the cause of action, and such
other allegations pertinent to the cause as the plaintiff may
deem necessary to sustain his suit. 133 Texas defines
a cause of action as a fact or facts entitling one to institute
and maintain an action which must be alleged and proved
to obtain relief.
4
To require a "theory of action" or "theory of the plead-
ings ' ' 3 5 is to hamstring modern pleading with remnants of
the common law forms of action and of common law pleading
which serve no functional purpose. Let the case be deter-
mined on its merits.
4. To allow market value damages when no oil is
discovered is inconsistent with the damages allow-
ed when a small amount of oil is produced by a
trespasser 11
This is remindful of the famous doctrine of Flureau v
32. Rule 8(a)(2).
33. VERNON'S TEXAS STAT. ANN. ART. 2003 (1950).
34. A.H. Belo Corp. v Blanton, 133 Tex 301, 129 S.W.2d 619 (1939).
35. See Armacost v. Lindley, 116 Ind. 295, 19 N.E. 138 (1888) Martin v.
Smith, 214 Minn. 9, 7 N.W.2d 481 (1942) Anderson v Case, 28 Wis. 505 (1871).
36. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., supra note 2 SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 25 (1954).
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Thornhi137 which established the exception to the general
rule of damages that in a contract for the sale of land if the
vendor is incapable, without fraud, of giving a good title,
the vendee cannot recover for the loss of the bargain.
Flureau v Thornhill has been criticized as "not so fully
stated nor so completely reasoned as would be desirable" ,38
but is still followed, because the measure of damages con-
forms to the rule of damages where an action on the covenants
of title is brought against a vendor who conveyed land he
did not own.
It is an anomaly to restrict the vendee to the recovery
of a lesser sum when an ineffectual deed is given but allow
a larger recovery when the vendor, who discovers the
infirmity of his title, informs the vendee and declines to
execute a worthless deed. A more sensible solution would
be to examine the doctrine of Flureau v Thornhill, to
determine that compensatory damages are desirable and then
to re-examine and adjust damages allowed for willful breach
of covenants for title. It is illogical to deny damages
because of conflict with a malfunctioning rule.
Similarly, market value damages are incompatible with
damages allowed, the oil and gas produced with no allowance
for costs, when a willful trespasser produces a small quantity
of oil or gas. However, rather than disallowing market
value damages because of the conflict with an established
rule of oil and gas law, it is reasonable to search for the
more equitable result.
If it is desirable to give a landowner market value
damages for dry hole trespass, it is certainly as desirable
to compensate him to the same degree for the same loss
when the trespasser produces a small amount of oil or gas.
There is no reason to limit compensation to production. The
rule that a willful trespasser pay damages of all oil and gas
produced with no deduction of costs was formulated to dis-
37. 2 Win. Bi. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776).
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courage wrongful drilling and to provide a harsh penalty for
it. When the trespasser produces a limited amount, he
should not be permitted by a defect in this rule to avoid the
result of his trespass, the partial or complete destruction of
the market value of the land for oil and gas purposes.
A preferable result is obtained by allowing market value
damages for a dry hole trespass or for a willful trespass
which results in limited production of oil or gas, allowing
the trespasser to set off production against the loss in market
value. As production increases, the loss of market value
decreases, and from the point where the two lines intersect,
damages will equal the amount of production.
5. There may not be a permanent loss of market
value, as oil or gas may be produced by deepening
the well or by drilling at another location.9
Though receiving little attention by legal writers, this is
an interesting contention. Why, indeed, compensate for the
loss of market value when there is no certainty that the loss
is permanent? A stronger case could be made in support
of this contention if the later discovery of oil or gas upon
lands where a dry hole has been drilled were less of a rarity,
but where it is almost certain that damages lie, they cannot
be avoided upon the basis of a mere mathematical possi-
bility
6. During a controversy over the mineral estate, oil
or gas may be drained by wells on adjacent land,
while litigants hesitate to offset the drainage for
fear of drilling a dry hole which by ultimate
determination they had no right to drill.
40
This objection, while having validity, presents an unlikely
situation, especially today with our well-spacing regulations.
For the case to arise, drainage by a well on adjoining land
and a dispute over ownership of oil and gas rights must
simultaneously occur The dispute must be real and the
uncertainty genuine, because if either of the parties is
reasonably certain that he has a valid lease or deed, he will
38. Hammond v. Hannln, 21 Mich. 373 (1870).
39. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., supra note 2.
40. SUMMERs, op. cit. supra note 31.
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drill rather than suffer drainage. Furthermore, if substantial
drainage were likely to occur the controverting parties would
probably agree before extensive damage were done to pro
rate the responsibility and cost of drilling.
7 There is no necessity for market value damages,
as ordinary prudence will deter an oil operator
from drilling on another's land.
4 1
This is a punitive or deterrent, not a compensatory
damage theory Considering market value damages as
compensatory, this objection begs the question, for even
though a prudent operator would not ordinarily drill on
another's land, we need a measure of damages to compensate
the mineral estate owner if this does happen. It is no answer
to say that it occurs infrequently
As indicated in the consideration of these seven objections
to market value damages for dry hole trespass, this writer
feels that market value damages are the correct measure.
Oil and gas ownership is a property right which deserves the
sanction and protection of society The right is not merely
speculative, but has a market value. The landowner's loss
is his opportunity to sell or lease a valuable commodity-the
exclusive right to explore for oil and gas which commands
its price irrespective of the actual presence of minerals.
4 2
The purpose of compensatory damages is to place the
aggrieved party in the same financial position he would have
been in had his rights not been violated. To obtain this
optimum result, however, the property right should not be
protected in all cases of dry hole trespass. Perhaps it would
be helpful to call it a "qualified property right" as opposed
to an "absolute property right"
The landowner should be denied market value damages
for loss of cash bonus if he intended to develop the property
himself, because if he had drilled, he would not have received
a cash bonus and he would have expended money which has
been saved by the trespass. To give him damages would be
41. Martel v. Hall Oil co., supra note 2.
42. KULP, op. cit. supra note 30.
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to give him a windfall. However, the burden of proof as to
the landowner's intention belongs on the trespasser, because
he is the admitted wrongdoer and if there is no evidence
either way, the landowner should be entitled to a presumption
that he would have leased. Generally, landowners sell or
lease their mineral estates rather than developing the land
themselves, and while it is possible that the landowner might
have refused to lease or sell at the time of the trespass, the
chances are that he would have leased or sold while oil and
gas interest in the land was so high that the trespasser deemed
it desirable to drill.
If the property was held by an oil company or a
speculator at the time of the dry hole trespass, compensation
should be given if a sale, lease, or assignment was planned,
but not if the land was to be developed. A presumption could
be raised by examining the holder's past operations.
In considering damages for loss of the 1/8 (or other
fractional) royalty interest, the burden of proof should belong
on the landowner There is first the possibility that the
landowner would have developed the property, and therefore
gained by the trespass. Secondly, if the landowner leased,
there is the probability that he would have been content with
his "bird in the hand," the cash bonus, and his "birds in the
bush," the royalty interest, feeling that he had gotten some
cash, regardless of oil or gas discovery, and stood a chance
for a large return through his royalty interest. The courts
in the dry hole trespass cases have not considered that the
royalty interest has a market value and may be sold; however,
if the owner can show intent to sell, this is a real basis for
damages.
Although willingness to lease or sell oil and gas rights
is a desirable requisite for recovering market value damages,
there is a valid reason for not requiring proof of a specific
offer The land on which the trespasser wrongfully drilled
was in his possession or being claimed by him before he
drilled. During this time no prudent operator would have
offered the actual lease or sale value, if anything, because
[Vol. 40
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he would have been "buying a lawsuit" along with oil and
gas.
43
The writer suggests that the above is a practicable and
equitable solution to the question of damages for dry hole
trespass.
43. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926)
KULP, Op. cit. aupra note 30.
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